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ARISTOTLE ON TEMPERANCE1 *
Charles M. Young 
Departeent of Philosophy 
The Clareeont Graduate School
When ee Mere cut off froe our supplies and 
forced to go Mithout food, as is coMMon on 
Military caMpaigns, no one else endured it 
Mell. But Mhen there Mas plenty to eat, 
he alone Mas really able to enjoy it.a
Aristotle thinks that the virtues of character — courage, teeperance, 
liberality, and the rest — give rise to3 happiness, but he never tells us 
Mhy. Norse yet, his vieMS about happiness and about the virtues sake it hard 
to see Mhat explanation he could have given. EN. 1.7* tells us that Me are 
happy Mhen our capacities for rational thought and rational action are real­
ized with excellence. 9 If so, the virtues Mhich give rise to happiness Mould 
sees to be the intellectual virtues of practical and theoretical Misdoe, 
phronesis and sophia. But courage, teeperance, liberality, and the rest are 
virtues of character, not of the intellect (cf. 1.13, 1103*3-10). So Mhy does 
Aristotle think they are sources of happiness?
In the hope of solving this problee eventually, I have been Morking 
through the details of Aristotle's discussions of the various virtues of char­
acter in EN III-V and EE III. This paper presents a portion of that Mork:4 *
ay account of Aristotle's vieM of teeperance.
I
A useful place to begin is Mith Aristotle's doctrine of the Mean, his
idea that each virtue of character is a eesotes or Mean state.7 * There are teo 
parts to this doctrine, one ontological and one behavioral. Ontologically, a 
virtue is a eeeber of a triad, not one of a pair of opposites. Hoeever natu­
ral it eay be to think of courage as opposed to coMardice, or of teeperance as 
opposed to profligacy, Aristotle argues in EN II.6 that each virtue is instead
a Mean state Mhich is in soee sense "betMeen” two vices,, one of excess and one 
of defect (1107*2-3).· Behaviorally, a virtue is a Mean state in that it
gives rise to intereediate actions and passions. ttHhile the vices fall short
of, or go beyond, Mhat is required in action and passion," Aristotle says,
"the virtue finds and chooses Mhat is internediate" (1107*3-6).7 Aristotle
takes the ontological thesis to be a consequence of the behavioral one. "A
virtue is a sean state (eesotes).* he«says, because it aies at Mhat is inter- 
aediate (to Meson)" (1106*27-28).»·
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complications, and a subtler account of Aristotle's conception of temperance 
is accordingly to be sought.
II
Ne can begin to work towards a better account by trying to understand 
Aristotle's restriction of temperance to the pleasures11 human beings share 
with animals. He argues for this restriction in EN III.10 as follows. First 
he distinguishes between pleasures of the body and those of the soul, and 
asserts that temperance has to do only with the former: "People are not
called temperate," he says, "in relation to the pleasures of learning, nor 
profligate in relation to the pleasures of learning" (1117*28-1118*1). Next 
he sorts bodily pleasures into types by reference to the sensory modalities 
they involve, and, claiming that temperance is not concerned with the pleas­
ures of sight, hearing, or smell,12 he concludes that it is restricted to the 
pleasures of touch and taste, which human beings share with the other ani­
mals13 <1118*1-23)· Surprisingly, Aristotle goes on to exclude even the 
pleasures of taste from temperance. Tasting involves discrimination, he 
claims, and this is not what profligates enjoy.14 They seek rather the pleas­
ure that comes from touch, whether in eating, drinking, or sexual activity1* 
(1118*26-32). Because of this, profligacy — and temperance as well — is 
restricted to the animal pleasures that derive from the sense of touch 
(1118*1-4).
How are we to understand Aristotle's restriction of temperance to animal 
pleasures? Usually, when Aristotle connects temperance to animal pleasures, 
his point is the simple one that the class of pleasures with which temperance 
is concerned happens to coincide with the class of pleasures to which the 
other animals are sensitive. He actually argues for this coincidence in the 
EE,14 and he makes the point in the EN as well, saying that "temperance and 
profligacy are concerned with the sorts of pleasures in which the other ani­
mals also share" (1118*23-25). But the concluding remarks of III.10 break new 
ground:
Profligacy, then, corresponds to the most common (koinotate) of the 
senses, and it would seem that it is rightly reproached, because it be­
longs to us not insofar as we are human beings but insofar as we are 
animals. Tq, revel in such pleasures, or to be excessively fond of them, 
is bestial. (1118*1-4)
The claims here that profligacy "corresponds to the most common of the senses" 
and that it belongs to us "insofar as we are animals" should be understood in 
light of the psychology of the Djb Anima, which argues that sense perception 
(aisthesis) in general17 and the sense of touch in particular are definitive 
of animality. Plants, for Aristotle, are able to absorb nourishment directly 
from the environment. Animals lack this ability, and in consequence they need 
the ability to seize nourishment from their surroundings if they are to stay 
alive. This, Aristotle thinks, requires sense perception and especially the 1 
sense of touch. Touch is the crucial sense, in Aristotle's view, because the 
properties of nourishment — heat, cold, wetness, and dryness — are the pro­
per objects of that sense (De Anima 11.3, 414*5-15). Possession of the sense 
of touch, then, is for Aristotle part of what makes an organism an animal, and 
because it alone is common to all animals he can describe it in the EJY as "the
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long enough to reproduce. This requires that they take in nourishment, which 
Aristotle explains as what is hot, cold, wet, and dry. In the case of ani­
mals, the need for nourishment is registered in the psychic states of hunger 
and thirst, the one being an appetite for what is dry and hot, the other for 
what is cold and wet. Prompted by these appetites, an animal is led to seek 
repletion by eating and drinking appropriate substances. The ingested matter 
is then broken down by the process of digestion, and built back up into the 
body of the organism by metabolise. In this way the animal's body is main­
tained, so that it can reproduce.
The common appetites of EN 111.11 are clearly the hungers and thirsts 
mentioned in this account of nutrition. Aristotle connects common appetites 
with physical needs (1118*10), and he says that they are directed simply to­
wards nourishment, not towards particular sorts of nourishment (1118*9-12). 
Furthermore, his calling these appetites "natural* (1118*9) suggests that he 
takes them to have their origin in the bodily or animal nature of human 
beings, a suggestion buttressed by his labeling these appetites "common* 
(1118*8) just after calling the characteristically animal sense, touch, the 
"most common" of the senses (ΙΠ.10, 1118*1). That common appetites are 
grounded in our animal nature, finally, explains why they are universal to 
human beings (1118*10-11). Ne may take it, then, that common appetites are 
simply instances of hunger and thirst.80
Peculiar appetites are another matter. They differ from common appe­
tites first in being more finely focused: a common appetite is directed sim­
ply at nourishment, while a peculiar appetite is directed at a particular sort 
of nourishment. They also differ in what they require for explanation, Since 
common appetites are simply the psychic manifestations of physical needs, our 
having them can be explained solely by reference to physiology. But because 
peculiar appetites are more finely focused than common ones, our possessing 
them requires more by way of explanation. Hy needing food may explain why I 
want to eat something, but it cannot explain why 1 want to eat Athenian pas­
tries rather than broccoli.
Nhere is the fuller explanation of peculiar appetites to be found?
Surely in the fact that different people like to eat — derive physical pleas­
ure from eating — different sorts of foods. Consider this passage from 
III.11:
Regarding peculiar pleasures many people go wrong, and they go wrong in 
many ways. For when people are said to be fond of such-and-such, it is 
either because they enjoy things they shouldn't, or because they enjoy 
them more than most people do, or because they don't enjoy them as they 
should, and profligates exceed in all these ways. For they enjoy things 
they shouldn't (because the things are hateful); and if they do enjoy 
the things they should, they enjoy them more than they should, and more 
than most people. (1118*21-27)
Here Aristotle is clearly not talking about the pleasures we get simply from 
repletion; such pleasures could come from any sort of food. He is talking 
instead about the sense enjoyment we get from eating certain sorts of foods.
The distinction between common and peculiar appetites, then, is the dis­
tinction between appetites simply for food and drink and appetites for the
7
one's wanting to eat something, because one likes it, even when one doesn't 
need to eat.
V
He may now turn to Aristotle's account of temperance itself. Here again 
it will be useful to contrast the EN with the EE.. In characterizing temper­
ance and its correlative vices, the E£ says this:
He who is so disposed as to fall short of such things as nearly everyone 
must share in and take pleasure in is insensible, or whatever he should 
be called; and he who is excessive is profligate. For everyone by na­
ture enjoys these things and has appetites for them, and not everyone is 
called profligate. The reason for this is that they do not feel more 
pleasure than they should when they get them, nor more pain than they 
should when they do not. Nor are they unfeeling, for they do not fall 
short in feeling pleasure or pain; if anything they exceed. Since there 
is excess and deficiency concerning these objects, it is clear that 
there is also a mean state, and that this disposition is best, and that 
it is the opposite of both the others. Hence, if temperance is the best 
disposition concerning the things with which the profligate is con­
cerned, the mean state regarding the pleasant sensible objects just men­
tioned will be temperance, a mean state between profligacy and insen­
sibility. (111.2, 1231*26-39)
The EE thus characterizes temperance by contrasting it with the vices of in­
sensibility and profligacy. It observes, first, that insensible are deficient 
while profligates are excessive regarding the pleasures of food and drink.
Then it locates temperance between insensibility and profligacy, claiming that 
the existence of excessive and deficient states implies the existence of a 
mean state, that this mean state is the best state, and that this best state 
is temperance. The point to notice is that the EE. offers no positive account 
of temperance. Instead, it treats temperance as a privative motivational 
state, calling temperate those who avoid the errors of the profligate and the 
insensible.** To be sure, it does imply that temperate people enjoy the 
pleasures of eating and drinking "as they should," and that they do not feel 
more pain "than they should" when they fail to get them. But because it of­
fers no explanation of what the proper enjoyment of food and drink consists 
in, it gives these phrases no real content.
The EN/s account of temperance begins in the same way:
The temperate person is moderately disposed towards pleasures. He does 
not enjoy the things which the profligate most enjoys; if anything he 
detests them. In general, he neither enjoys things which he should not, 
nor enjoys too much anything of this sort. Hhen Csuch pleasures! are 
absent he feels neither pain nor appetite, except moderately, nor does 
he desire them more than he should, nor when he shouldn't, and so on. 
U1I.11, 1119*11-15)
So far, we are no better off in the EN than we were in the EE, — we have no 
idea of exactly what foods and drinks temperate people should and should not
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to take pleasure in what is bad tor thee, they are tree to eat and drink cer­
tain things solely tor the sake ot the pleasure they bring. Eating and drink­
ing say be activities in which we engage because we are aniaals, but teaperate 
people are able to accept — indeed, to welcoae — the pleasures these activ­
ities bring.**
Nhat about protligates and insensible people? Aristotle accuses the 
profligates of a Multitude of sins. He says that they:
a. enjoy things they should not (III.11, 1118*23, b25),
b. enjoy things More than they should (*23, *26),
c. enjoy things sore than aost people (*23-24, *27),
d. enjoy things in the wrong way (*24), and
e. prefer these pleasures to other pleasures (1119*2-3).
Errors of three different kinds are attributed to profligates in these pas­
sages. First there are the errors in object cited in (a): profligates take
pleasure in eating and drinking inappropriate objects. Then there are the 
errors in degree Mentioned in (b), (c), and (d): even froa appropriate ob­
jects, profligates derive aore pleasure than is appropriate. Finally there is 
the error in preference of (e). Of these errors, the first is not unique to 
the profligate. Aristotle distinguishes profligates froa incontinent persons 
on the grounds that the foraer do, while the latter do not, believe that the 
objects in which they indulge are appropriate (cf., e.g., VII.8, 1151*11-14). 
No doubt errors of degree are also coaaon to incontinent agents as well.*4 
Thus it is the error in preference which is fundaaental to profligacy: as 
Aristotle says, "the profligate is led by his desire to prefer the pleasures 
[of food and drink] to other things" (111.11, 1119*1-3). The excessive state 
with respect to the pleasures of food and drink is at bottoa a cognitive 
state, not an appetitive one. Profligates think that these aniaal pleasures 
are worthy of serious pursuit.
Those deficient with respect to the pleasures of food and drink are the 
insensible. Aristotle explains how they are deficient by saying that insen­
sible people find nothing pleasant, and nothing aore pleasant than anything 
else (111.11, 1119*9). Their condition is thus that they experience and . 
satisfy coaaon appetites, and not peculiar ones. They eat and drink what is 
necessary to Maintain their bodies, but they take no pleasure in doing so. 
Insensible people, then, are not to be confused with anorexics. Their problea 
is not that they eat and drink too little, but that they do not partake of the 
pleasures eating and drinking naturally bring. They disdain the pleasures 
teaperate people welcoae.
VI
Before suaaing up, I should deal with a few loose ends: taste, sex, and
wine. Earlier I noted in passing that one curious aspect of Aristotle's 
account of teaperance is that he excludes the pleasures of taste froa its 
sphere. This idea is coaaon to both the E£ and the EN, but the EN offers a 
aore effective defense of it. The E£ offers us only the unargued claia that 
the other aniaals are insensitive to such pleasures, together with a point of 
folk wisdoa to the effect that gluttons pray for long throats, not for long 
tongues (III.2, 1231*12-17). The EN does better, saying that taste involves
il
elsewhere,2* but our appetites for sex, unlike our appetites for food and 
drink, do not spring fro· physical needs»30 Ne can live without sex, but not 
without food and drink.31 Aristotle ignores alcohol, then, because our appe­
tite for it has no physical basis. And he treats sex uncertainly, because, 
although it does have a physical basis, it is not based in a physical need.
VII
In a final view of Aristotelian teeperance, the eleeent to stress is its 
connection with anieality. For Aristotle, huean beings are rational animals. 
As anieals, we are naturally subject to appetites for food and drink, and we 
are are sensitive to the pleasures the satisfaction of these appetites can 
bring. Aristotelian teeperance concerns the place of such pleasures in huean 
life. Since our anieality is not the distinguishing aspect of our hueanity, 
the pleasures relating to it should not be of eajor concern to us. Still, our 
susceptibility to these pleasures is grounded in the sort of creature we are: 
our anieality is part of our essence. The field of Aristotelian temperance, 
then, is the relation of a rational anieal to its anieality, as expressed in 
the pleasures it takes in the anieal activities of eating and drinking. Tem­
perate people relate properly to their anieality, and accord the pleasures 
attaching to it their proper worth. Insensible people and profligates, each 
in their own way, misjudge the pleasures and misjudge themselves.
Profligates over-value the pleasures of food and drink. Such pleasures, 
on Aristotle's account, do have value, but their value is limited. Eating and 
drinking are activities we engage in because we are anieals; they are not dis­
tinctively huean activities. Accordingly, the pleasures these activities 
bring are not distinctively huean pleasures,32 and in attaching the importance 
they do to such pleasures, profligates value thee more than they are worth. 
This failing, though, is symptomatic of a deeper one. Huean beings have 
anieality as their genus and rationality as their specific differentia. The 
distinctively huean pleasures, then, are those which attach to rationality.
It may be said, therefore, that in preferring anieal pleasures to rational 
ones, profligates show that they do not understand the kind of being they are. 
Their preferences are evidence that they identify themselves not with their 
rationality, as Aristotle recommends (X.7, 1177*26-1170*8), but with their 
animality. They see themselves as anieals, not as huean beings, and to say 
that they are bestial is an accurate reproach <cf. III.10, 1110*1-4).
Insensible people err in the contrary direction. The pleasures of eat­
ing and drinking are not worth as euch as profligates think, but they are 
worth something, and insensible people go wrong in taking little or no pleas­
ure in food and drink. Their error, like the profligates', reflects a more 
serious one. Our animality is not the most important part of our hueanity, 
but it really is a part of it. Anieality is our genus, and in taking little 
or no pleasure in food and drink, insensible people in effect repudiate this 
part of their hueanity. As Aristotle puts it, "insensibility is not human” 
(III.11, 1119*6-7); "a creature to whom nothing is pleasant, and to whom 
nothing is more pleasant than anything else is very far from a huean being" 
(1119*9-10). Profligates may identify themselves with their animality, but 
insensible people disown it altogether.33 The name Aristotle coins for their 
condition, anai sthesi a (insensibility) is singularly apt: anai sthesia is the
FOOTNOTES
* I adopt the sost usual translation of sophrosune. despite its inade­
quacies, because the alternatives — "self-control" and "self-restraint" -- 
are even less acceptable. Either alternative carries the strong suggestion 
that a display of sophrosune requires reason to defeat appetite in a struggle 
within the teeperate agent, a struggle the existence of which Aristotle denies 
(cf., e.g., Nicoeachean Ethics II.3t 1104*3-7). Etyeologically, sophrosune 
weans soeething like eental health — being of "sound" (sos) "wind" (phren) -- 
and an ideal translation would capture this idea. The standard general treat- 
sent of the Breek notion is H. Norths Sophrosune: Self-Knowledqe and Selj_-
Restraint in 6reek Literature, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
I960).
3 Alcibiades describing Socrates at Potidaea, in Plato's Svsposiuw 
(219e8-220a2).
3 If a capacity is one the realization of which is part of what happiness 
consists in, I say that it oives rise to happiness and that it is a source of 
happiness. It is by now cossonly held that, asong the goods Aristotle recog­
nizes, we should distinguish between (a) cosponents of happiness, like coura­
geous or liberal activity, and (b) instrusental seans to happiness, like 
wealth. But this division ignores goods like the virtues thesselves, which 
are (c) sources of happiness in the sense just explained, and also (d) esbel- 
1ishaents of happiness, like good looks or fine children (cf. Nicoeachean 
Ethics 1.8, 1099*33-*6, and 1.9, 1099*26-28). These four kinds of goods are 
related in that instrusental goods affect the extent to which the virtues give 
rise to virtuous activity, while esbel1ishsents affect the degree of happiness 
enjoyed by the virtuously active.
* Henceforth I refer to the Nicoeachean Ethics with "EN" and to the 
Eudesian Ethics with "EE”, to books with Rosan nuserals and to chapters with 
Arabic ones. Thus the first sentence of the Nicoeachean Ethics is EN 1.1, 
1094*1-3.
•
8 The definition of 1.7 says that happiness is "activity of soul in 
accordance with excellence" (1098 a 16-17); 1.13, 1103 a 3-10 (asong other 
passages), sakes it plain that this definition includes both theoretical and 
practical activity.
* For accounts of aspects of Aristotle's conception of courage, see sy 
papers "Aristotle on Courage," in 6. Howe, ed., Husanitas; Essays in Honor of. 
Ralph Ross (Claresont, Ca.: Scripps College Press, 1977), pp. 194-203, and
"Virtue and Flourishing in Aristotle's Ethics," in D. Depew, ed., The Greeks 
and the 6ood Life (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co·, 1980), pp. 138-156.
7 A source of confusion in dealing with the literature on the doctrine of 
the sean is that Aristotle uses two words — the adjective seson and the noun 
sesotes — both of which can be translated as "sean." Thus Rackhas translates 
sesotes as "sean state" and seson as "sean,” while Ross renders sesotes with 
"sean" and seson with "intersediate." As a result, it is not always clear 
whether in discussing the doctrine of the sean a cossentator has in sind the 
idea (i) that a virtue is a sesotes or (ii) that a virtue aiss at what is
12 It is interesting that the |jN allows lor excess and deficiency with 
respect to the pleasures of sight, hearing, and taell, while the EE does not. 
Perhaps the EE. is silent on this point because it typically assunes that the 
presence of excess and deficiency by itself inplies the existence of a virtu­
ous aean state (cf., e.g., III.2, 1231*34-36, on tenperance, and III.3,
1231·* 15-219 on gentleness). On this assumption, the Mention of excess and 
deficiency with respect to the pleasures of sight, say, would have inclined 
it, inplausibly, to recognize a virtue with respect to these pleasures. Be­
cause the EN wakes no coaparable assunption, it can Mention such pleasures 
safely.
13 Aristotle goes too far in his confidence that non-hunan aniwals take 
no pleasure in senses other than touch. If pleasure is (found in) the unin- 
peded activity of a natural state, as Aristotle holds (cf. EN Vil.12, 1153*14- 
15), there seeas to be no good reason for thinking that aniwals' sensory 
pleasures are restricted to touch and taste.
14 I shall have wore to say in Section VI (below) about Aristotle's argu- 
went for elininating the pleasures of taste fron the sphere of tenperance.
18 According to III.10, 1118*4-8, not even all tactile pleasures — 
notably not the "refined" pleasures of the gynnasiun — are regulated by 
tenperance.
14 EE III.2, 1230*22-35, locates the class of pleasures with which ten­
perance is concerned; 1230*38 - 1231*7 isolates the class of pleasures to 
which aniwals are sensitive; and 1230*36-38 notes that the two classes coin­
cide.
tT The bluntest statenent of this idea occurs at De Sensu 1, 436*10-12: 
"Each aninal insofar as it is an aninal has to have sense-perception, for it 
is by this that we distinguish between what is and what is not an aninal."
Cf. also De Anina II.2, 413*1-4.
18 Aristotle seens not to know about anorexia. No doubt he would treat 
it too as a pathological. Cf., though, n. 21 below.
λ* The renainder of this paragraph freely sunnarizes the relevant por­
tions of De Anina II.3-4.
20 Aristotle's oastrinarooi (III.11, 1118*19) — our boulenics — appar­
ently have connon appetites even without physical needs, while anorexics have 
the needs without the appetites.
at For the idea of a privative Motivational state, see R. B. Brandt, 
"Traits of Character," Anerican Philosophical Quarterly, 7 (1970), pp. 23-37. 
For a wodern account of tenperance which wakes it a privative state, see J. D. 
Wallace, Virtues and Vices (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1978), Ch. 3.
aa Cf., e.g., De Anina II.3, 414*4-6; EN III.1, 1111*32-3; |E II.7, 1223 
a 34; and Rhetoric 1. 11, 1370*16-18.
